"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. ,,2
INTRODUCTION
The "central value of the Fourth Amendment" is the protection of the sanctity of the home from unjustifiable intrusion by law enforcement officials. 3 It is settled law that before law enforcement officers may enter a home to conduct a search or make an arrest they must, absent consent 4 or exigent circumstances, 5 first procure a valid warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate. 6 The entire beneficial nature of the warrant requirement, however, rests upon the necessary assumption that in each case the law enforcement officer's warrant application affidavit faithfully provides to the magistrate a Part Ill explains how such police perjury strikes at the very heart of the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment provides. Part IV explains the Supreme Court's holding in Franks and identifies the many questions left unanswered by the majority opinion. Parts V, VI, and VII articulate the proper legal doctrines to govern cases of allegedly falsified warrant affidavits and explain why the barriers erected by the lower courts are unjustifiable. This Article concludes that allegations of perjurious warrant affidavits present pure issues of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. If the trier of fact determines that one or more perjured statements in the warrant affidavit caused the search or arrest, then the Fourth Amendment has been violated, entitling the victim to relief without the necessity of surmounting any additional legal barriers.
THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED WARRANT AFFIDAVITS
Legal scholars have generally assumed, with no empirical foundation, that law enforcement officers so rarely file perjured warrant affidavits that the issue is unworthy of concern. Indeed, to the extent the issue has been discussed at all, scholars have concluded that the warrant requirement itself operates as an effective deterrent to such police perjury.1 3 Scholars of the Fourth Amendment generally advance the argument that law enforcement officers not only have less incentive to lie in a warrant affidavit, but also that it is more difficult for them to do so because they file the warrant affidavit prior to conducting the search.' 4 At that stage, officers are unaware of whether the search will be successful in discovering the sought-after contraband or other evidence of illegality. Scholars bolster this argument with the assertion that a magistrate is more likely to uncover police perjury when deciding whether to issue a warrant than a judge, ruling on a motion to suppress after the occurrence of the search. 15 The assumption that police perjury in warrant affidavits is rare and effectively deterred by the warrant application process is counter-intuitive and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 14 See, e.g, Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases-Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 292 (1985) ; Steiker, supra note 13, at 854; Stuntz, Remedies, supra note 13, at 915.
15. See Stuntz, Remedies, supra note 13, at 915. The larger argument made by Professor Stuntz, that the warrant requirement disproportionately protects upper and middle class Americans, is contradicted by the empirical reality that the poor (except for the truly homeless 
PERJURED AFFIDAVITS AND THE FOURTHAMENDMENT
The disturbing ease with which one can find examples of falsified warrant applications provides powerful evidence of the serious problem of police perjury in our society. In 2002, the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reported that in September of 2000, the federal government admitted to "misstatements and omissions of material acts" in "75 FISA applications related to major terrorist attacks directed against the United States. ' '22 As a result, the court refused to accept inaccurate affidavits from FBI agents and even prohibited one FBI agent from appearing before the court as a FISA affiant. 23 Six months later, in March 2001, the federal government admitted to "similar misstatements in another series of FISA applications."
2 4
More disturbing is the Justice Department's apparent lack of interest in the punishment of the FBI agents or the prevention of similar future occurrences. The FISC noted that:
These incidents have been under investigation by the FBI's and the Justice Department's Offices of Professional Responsibility for more than one year to determine how the violations occurred in the field offices, and how the misinformation found its way into the FISA applications and remained uncorrected for more than one year despite procedures to verify the accuracy of FISA pleadings. As of this date, no report has been published, and how these misinterpretations occurred remains unexplained to the Court.
25
In 2001, the FBI undertook "Operation Candyman," one of the largest investigations into the internet distribution of child pornography. The operation's efforts were jeopardized upon discovery that the sworn affidavits of an FBI Special Agent, filed in support of numerous applications to search the REPORT Similarly, subsequent evidence revealed that the warrant authorizing the search of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas, which resulted in a law enforcement disaster and the death of several innocent children, was based on an affidavit containing many falsehoods. 27 Search and arrest warrants and the resulting criminal prosecution for federal gun crimes are routinely based on the purported accuracy of the information contained in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The head of the National Firearms Act branch of the Bureau has stated, "When we testify in court, we testify that the database is one hundred percent accurate. That's what we testify to, and we will always testify to that. As you probably well know, that may not be one hundred percent true.8
2s
Abundant examples of law enforcement officers falsifying statements of their own observations in warrant affidavits also exist. 29 One such example is the well-documented common practice of police officers including fictitious statements from nonexistent confidential informants in warrant affidavits. 30 Even when a confidential informant actually exists, law enforcement officers frequently falsify statements in the warrant 28 Kopel & Blackman, supra note 27, at 8-9. In truth, the accuracy of this database has been as low as fifty percent. Id. at 9. Law enforcement officers also routinely present the results of DNA testing, fingerprint analysis, and other laboratory procedures as entirely accurate in affidavits for search and arrest warrants despite their actual knowledge that the reliability and integrity of the crime laboratories are open to serious doubt. See. Police perjury in warrant affidavits thus constitutes a serious problem. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the warrant application process is entirely unsuited to the discovery of false statements in warrant affidavits.
3 2 The magistrate conducts the warrant application ex parte and rarely questions the police officer about the content of the affidavit. In any event, the magistrate lacks the investigative resources to verify the truthfulness of the statements in the officer's affidavit. 33 Additionally, because the law enforcement officer who signs the warrant affidavit oftentimes simply relays information learned from another officer, 34 the warrant affidavit may consist entirely of hearsay. 35 In such cases, the supposed ability of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the affiant becomes an ineffective safeguard. Even when a search is based on a warrant, the first opportunity the criminal process affords the defendant to challenge the factual basis for the search occurs at an after-the-fact suppression hearing. At that time, the magistrate's prior issuance of a warrant generally creates "a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. ' 
III. THE ERODING EFFECTS OF PERJURY ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment requires that, in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a warrant must: (1) be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate; (2) set forth under oath or affirmation facts sufficient to establish probable cause; and (3) particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or 38 things to be seized.
Perjurious warrant affidavits defeat each of the three requirements imposed by the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.
39
Probable cause for a search warrant exists "where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.
4 0 In each case, an assessment of probable cause requires the consideration of two necessary elements: (1) the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case; and (2) whether these facts and circumstances are sufficient to constitute probable cause. 41 Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the foundation of the probable cause analysis is "the known facts and circumstances," this somewhat misleading statement creates a misperception of objectivity.
42
A police officer's assertions in a warrant affidavit are ordinarily based upon "hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39. The Fourth Amendment particularity requirement relates to and buttresses the probable cause requirement because it too is intended to prevent "the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). Therefore, the discussion herein of the effect of perjurious warrant affidavits on the probable cause requirement is equally applicable to the particularity requirement. In addition, another purpose of the particularity requirement is to limit the scope and intensity of the execution of the warrant. Moreover, the significance of the information in the warrant affidavit, which itself may be entirely innocent, 44 often depends upon the assertion and characterization of background "facts and circumstances" by the law enforcement officer. 45 In short, the Fourth Amendment does not require that "every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct;" rather, merely that the officer's assertions therein "be 'truthful' in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. 46 Therefore, probable cause is not necessarily based on actual reality but on the factual nature of the law enforcement affiant's state of mind and veracity. Intentionally or recklessly false statements in warrant affidavits by police officers strip the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause of its value. 47 The purpose of the probable cause requirement is to ensure that residential searches and seizures are constitutionally permissible only when based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing created by the actions of the home's occupant.
48
Unless one engages in the implausible assumption that the law enforcement officer acts without purpose, the officer's necessary intent behind an intentionally or recklessly false statement in a warrant affidavit is to manufacture probable cause or particularity where none actually exists.
When the focus is shifted from the reporting of the facts and circumstances in sworn affidavits filed by law enforcement officers to the determination of whether those facts and circumstances sufficiently establish probable cause, it becomes apparent that perjured warrant affidavits strike at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause. The central purpose of the warrant clause is to prevent unjustifiable governmental intrusions into the sanctity of the home, not merely to deter or punish such intrusions after the fact. 54 An individual must be truly impartial and independent to qualify as a "neutral and detached magistrate."
55
A police officer, prosecutor, or anyone else actively involved in the investigation of the alleged criminal activity lacks the requisite independence and impartiality necessary to serve as a magistrate.
56
"Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement."
57
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the very purpose of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is to mandate that the decision whether a residential search or seizure is justifiable must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate and not a law enforcement officer:
The informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.
58
Perjurious statements in warrant affidavits by law enforcement officers deprive magistrates of the accurate information necessary to exercise their informed judgment and thereby impermissibly substitute the police officer for the magistrate as the actual decision-maker in the warrant issuance process.
59
The Supreme Court noted this intent of the warrant clause: "The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of [law enforcement officials]. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. It is violative of the most fundamental values of the Fourth Amendment for the magistrate to act as a mere "rubber stamp" for warrant decisions actually made by law enforcement officers. 6 1 For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a valid warrant cannot be based on an affidavit which contains only the beliefs, suspicions, or conclusions of a police officer.
62 "Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause."
63
Other bedrock Fourth Amendment principles serve to guarantee that the independent and detached magistrate, rather than a law enforcement officer, makes the assessment of whether the underlying facts and circumstances sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus, neither a search nor a seizure may be justified on the basis of information learned as a result of the search or seizure or any other after-acquired knowledge. 64 An essential corollary to this principle is the established doctrine that "an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate.
' 65 Absent stringent judicial enforcement of this "four corners" rule, the warrant clause would be rendered meaningless with search and arrest warrants issued not on the basis of the independent and informed judgment of the magistrate, but instead on the unreviewed discretion of law enforcement officers. The police would indirectly be empowered to perform that which the Constitution prohibits if done directly-conduct residential searches and seizures without a valid warrant issued by a magistrate with knowledge of the underlying information believed to justify the invasion. In such cases, "the provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases and the 61. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108-09 (stating magistrate must look at underlying circumstances upon which affiant bases his or her belief that probable cause exists). 
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protections it affords largely nullified., 66 In short, a law enforcement officer who files a warrant affidavit that contains intentionally or recklessly false statements of fact usurps the constitutionally mandated role of the magistrate. The officer deprives the magistrate of the truthful information necessary to make an independent and informed decision regarding probable cause. The nature of the assessment of whether probable cause exists further emphasizes the harm done to the targets of such police intrusions, many of whom are entirely innocent, and to the Fourth Amendment itself. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
69
The magistrate acts as an ordinary, reasonably prudent and cautious person when making the determination whether the facts, as presented in the affidavit, are sufficient to constitute probable cause. She merely makes a reasonable factual prediction that the object of the search will be found at the targeted location. 70 The Supreme Court recognizes that "the probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. '71 The magistrate acts not as a legally trained jurist because "many warrants are-quite properly-issued on the basis of nontechnical, 78 In Franks, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the limited question: "Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding ever have the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant. ' 79 All but one of the federal circuit courts of appeals had already answered this question affirmatively. 80 The courts of appeals then proceeded to consider the separate and distinct issue of the circumstances under which such a challenge to the veracity of a warrant affidavit could be made by a criminal defendant in a and at the same time, reaffirmed that lower courts should uphold magistrates' determinations whether warrants should issue if a substantial basis exists Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining majority's dual standard of review). Even appeals from probable cause determinations made in suppression hearings, involving warrantless searches and seizures, are reviewable only for clear error and deference must be given to the inferences drawn by the trial court judge. Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
74. This shift in concern, from the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the exclusionary rule and the criminal justice process of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of persons accused of committing criminal acts, was understandable given the facts of Franks. Jerome Franks became the prime suspect in a rape case when he made an incriminating statement while in custody for allegedly assaulting another female.8 4 Thereafter, the two police officers investigating the matter submitted a sworn affidavit to a Justice of the Peace in support of an application for a warrant to search Franks's apartment. This affidavit included the statement that "your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams and Mr. Wesley Lucas... where Jerome Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both these people" and that each of them "revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of Jerome Franks" matched the description given by the victim. 85 The Justice of the Peace issued the warrant, and as a result of the search, police seized clothing and a knife fitting a description provided by the victim. 86 Franks's This latter criticism is entirely misplaced in the case of perjurious warrant affidavits:
Cardozo's masterful imagery calls to mind a dull-witted but honest servant of the law, floundering in a sea of emergent and sophisticated jurisprudential choices while a crafty criminal squirms away through a constitutional loophole .... But what do "blunders" have to do with perjurious affidavits... deliberately employed to enlist the courts as "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold?"
The Franks majority, after an extended discussion of the opposing arguments, ultimately rejected the dissenters' challenge to the exclusionary rule and adhered to the traditional doctrine that the rule should be applied where, as in the case of perjured warrant affidavits, "the Fourth Amendment violation [is] substantial and deliberate." 94 The majority nevertheless held that concerns about the scope of the exclusionary rule and the practicalities of the criminal process rendered the issue of perjurious warrant affidavits one of "competing values that lead us to impose limitations" on the Fourth Amendment right.
95
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Franks stated cavalierly and in "generalized language" the limitations which the Court deemed necessary by the exclusionary rule and by the practicalities of the criminal justice process:
[W]e hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the alleged false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded.
96
The superficial nature of the Court's holding is clear from its failure to even acknowledge the conflicting decisions in the lower courts on some of these The standard for determining when "the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause" also lacks clarity.
10 0 Finally, the Court never fully explicated the nature of the "substantial preliminary showing" required by Franks.' 0 ' The lower courts, in the course of adjudicating numerous challenges against allegedly perjurious warrant affidavits, have filled this vacuum with conflicting and often unjustifiably restrictive decisions. In addition, many lower courts have applied these unduly restrictive doctrines to civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the "competing values" relied upon by the Supreme Court in Franks have no applicability. When a defense attorney can question neither the police officer who filed an affidavit nor the unnamed informant described in the affidavit, he usually has no way to determine whether the informant made the statements attributed to him or even whether the informant existed. Unless perjurious police officers lie in artless, obvious ways or attend religious meetings, repent their misconduct, and confess their dishonesty to defense attorneys, Franks's requirement of a substantial preliminary showing becomes an insurmountable "Catch 22"-a defense attorney cannot develop the facts until he secures a Even in the context of a criminal defendant's motion to suppress, these two legal doctrines, properly interpreted, should not impose insuperable obstacles to meritorious Fourth Amendment claims.
More importantly, neither the requirement of a substantial preliminary hearing nor the government's informant privilege has any basis in the Fourth Amendment itself. The practical considerations upon which each doctrine is founded are unique to the context of a motion to suppress in a criminal case and have no applicability in civil actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. The Substantial Preliminary Showing
In Franks, the Supreme Court set forth that a criminal defendant must establish a substantial preliminary showing:
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to crossexamine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. 1
06
The Franks Court clearly intended for the substantial preliminary showing requirement to act as a procedural mechanism to weed out frivolous claims unworthy of evidentiary hearings, reserved for serious allegations of police perjury in warrant affidavits.' 0 7
The practical realities inherent in the criminal justice system create the need for such a procedural device. Criminal defendants lose nothing by filing even non-meritorious pre-trial motions because the criminal justice system fails to provide any disincentive to the filing of frivolous Franks claims. Additionally, the criminal justice system perversely encourages criminal defendants to file such a claim in every case no matter how baseless the assertion. A criminal defendant has no constitutional right to discovery of the prosecutor's evidence in a criminal case, except to the very limited extent required by 
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HeinOnline -- Many lower courts have elevated the substantial preliminary showing requirement into a virtually insurmountable barrier by misconstruing the requirement as an authorization to determine the factual merits of the criminal defendant's claim before the evidentiary hearing mandated by Franks."
1 ' The very notion that a court may properly decide questions of fact before conducting an evidentiary hearing is contrary to the American system of justice. The only two arguments one could conceivably make to support this position are entirely implausible. The first such argument seizes upon the Court's statement in Franks that " [t] here is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant."
112 It is clear, however, from the Court's placement of this sentence-after its discussion of the rationales for the preliminary showing requirement and immediately before its exposition of the specifics of that requirement-that this "presumption of validity" was simply a reason for the requirement itself and nothing more.
113
This conclusion also follows from the fact that the majority in Franks explicitly required that courts determine the factual sufficiency of a challenge to the truthfulness of a warrant affidavit at the evidentiary hearing. At such hearings, the criminal defendant bears the burden of proof "by a preponderance of the evidence.",
114
The second argument is even less convincing. It assumes that the Supreme Court, by mandating the proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard at the evidentiary hearing, requires a criminal defendant to prove the facts of his claim by some lesser evidentiary standard as a prerequisite to entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. 115 This argument is belied by the fact that the Supreme for the preliminary showing and that no such lesser standard readily comes to mind. Finally, it is revealing that the lower courts, which do make factual determinations at the preliminary showing stage, never specify this lesser standard of factual proof but instead merely conclude that the defendant failed to meet the standard. 1 6 The majority opinion in Franks makes clear that the substantial preliminary showing requirement is intended to measure the legal sufficiency of the criminal defendant's allegations, not the factual question of whether the defendant can prove these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing. Precisely for this reason, the Supreme Court repeatedly used the word "allegations" to describe the burden imposed upon criminal defendants at the preliminary showing stage of the proceedings.
117
Some lower federal courts have unthinkingly transplanted the substantial preliminary showing requirement to civil actions brought pursuant to § 1983.' 18 In doing so, these courts have ignored the fact that the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court in Franks have no applicability to civil actions because they are based entirely on practical considerations unique to criminal cases.
119 In a criminal case, the success of the search establishes some indicia of the truthfulness of the warrant affidavit of the law enforcement officer. In contrast, in a § 1983 action, where the search failed to uncover any contraband or other evidence of criminal wrongdoing,1 20 the defendant police officer affiant should 12 1 Furthermore, § 1983 plaintiffs do not have any incentive to file non-meritorious actions, and they may not seek more discovery than is expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The substantial preliminary showing requirement has no place in civil § 1983 actions for another even more fundamental reason. If the requirement is intended to serve an analytical purpose in a civil action, rather than merely expressing an unjustifiable judicial hostility to the plaintiff's substantive cause of action, then it must function as a heightened pleading or proof requirement. The United States Supreme Court, however, has expressly repudiated the efforts of lower federal courts to impose heightened pleading or proof requirements on disfavored civil claims, including those brought pursuant to § 122
1983.
A § 1983 plaintiff prevails at the summary judgment stage of the civil action unless "no genuine issue as to any material fact" exists and the defendant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." ' 123 In Crawford-El v. Britton, 124 the Supreme Court expressly held that a court may not impose any heightened proof requirement in civil actions brought pursuant to § 1983.125
The substantial preliminary showing requirement is simply inapplicable to civil actions challenging the truthfulness of affidavits underlying search warrants.
B. The Informant Privilege
Some lower federal courts have also inappropriately elevated the government's informant privilege into an unassailable obstacle for a criminal defendant. These courts have concluded that the defendant has not satisfied the substantial preliminary showing requirement, even if the warrant affidavit undermine conviction). But see Beck v. City of Muskogee, 195 F.3d 553, 588 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (interpreting footnote 7 of Heck to allow § 1983 suits regarding the search leading to arrest and/or conviction). In any event, as a practical matter, a § 1983 claim would not be worth pursuing if the search was successful. This position, however, ignores the fact that if the alleged falsehood in the affidavit sufficiently satisfies the substantial preliminary showing requirement, then the very purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to determine the source responsible for that falsehood. 128 Further, assessing legal culpability is more complex than simply an either/or determination of the original source of the perjurious falsehood in the affidavit. Even if the confidential informant is the original source of the perjurious falsehood, an evidentiary hearing remains necessary to resolve the factual issue of whether the law enforcement affiant had knowledge of or recklessly disregarded the informant's false statement, or wrongfully vouched for the informant's reliability, veracity, or basis of knowledge.' 29 An evidentiary hearing does not necessarily require the disclosure of the informant's identity to the defendant or her counsel. At an evidentiary hearing, the court possesses many tools to assist in making accurate and just factual conclusions without jeopardizing the informant's identity, including cross-examination of the law enforcement affiant and production of the confidential informant for in camera examination by the court.
130
While an evidentiary hearing does not necessarily entail the compelled disclosure of the informant's identity, the question remains whether a criminal defendant may be entitled to such disclosure once he establishes a substantial The reluctance of the courts to require disclosure of a confidential informant in an appropriate case, or at least to ensure the truthfulness of the law enforcement affiant's representation of the informant's reliability, is entirely the product of the practicalities of the criminal justice system. Aside from the fact that the criminal process encourages the misuse of preliminary motions by defendants for ulterior purposes, the reality is that "[t]he very purpose of a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand."'
136
The government's informant privilege will rarely, if ever, be an appropriate obstacle to a § 1983 plaintiffs ability to remedy an alleged Franks violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that evidentiary privileges must be strictly construed for the simple reason that 131. 386 U.S. 300 (1967 the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged ...
[U]nder these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the government to withhold the identity .... Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64-65. In a civil § 1983 action, the law enforcement officer, now a defendant, often seeks to rely on information allegedly received from a confidential informant to prove the truthfulness of the challenged statements contained in the search warrant affidavit. In such situations, the court cannot permit the law enforcement officer to testify concerning the existence or reliability of the informant while, at the same time, assert a privilege to avoid disclosure of the identity of that informant. Cf 1983) (concluding defendant could retain confidentiality of its sources but had to forgo reliance on those sources for its defense). 142. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-99 (1998) (noting availability of several procedures for trial judge to reduce burden on any party).
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the false statement was included in the affidavit by the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth."' 43 The federal courts of appeals have generally concluded that " [t] he Supreme Court in 'Franks gave no guidance concerning what constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except to state that "negligence or innocent mistake [is] insufficient .... 1 44 On the basis of this erroneous premise, 145 these federal courts of appeals have either abdicated their responsibility to locate the meaning of the phrase "reckless disregard for the truth" within the Fourth Amendment or developed an interpretation inconsistent with Fourth Amendment values.
A. The Inappropriate Analogy to First Amendment Doctrine
The federal courts of appeals erroneously borrow their definition of "reckless disregard for the truth" from the Supreme Court's definition of actual malice in its First Amendment jurisprudence. 146 In this regard, the Supreme Court held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 147 that a public official or public figure cannot recover damages for defamatory statements absent proof that the speaker made the statement with actual malice. 148 Actual malice means that the allegedly defamatory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 149 In other words, the First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability under the actual malice standard, absent proof that the statement was made "with a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." of reckless disregard for the truth into its Fourth Amendment analysis of perjured warrant affidavits. In the First Amendment context of confidential informants, reckless disregard for the truth means that the law officer affiant had "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports" or "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the statement.' 5 ' Lower courts imported this heightened standard into the Fourth Amendment and held that no Franks violation exists absent proof that the law enforcement affiant had "obvious reasons to doubt the truth" of the statement(s) in the warrant affidavit. 152 In doing so, the courts have offered no rationale other than the unhappy coincidence that the Supreme Court used the same phrase of "reckless disregard for the truth" in Franks that it had previously used in Sullivan.
Upon analysis, the Sullivan Court's "reckless disregard for the truth" standard is entirely inconsistent with the important Fourth Amendment principles that Franks sought to protect. The First Amendment freedom of speech clause preserves the free, democratic character of our society by guaranteeing the right of ordinary persons, and their media representatives, to engage in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ... debate on public issues." ' 153 The Supreme Court has recognized the inevitability of exaggerations, distortions, vilifications, falsehoods, mischaracterizations, and unsupported conclusory statements in the public discussion of public persons and public affairs by which a free people governs itself in a democracy. 154 Under the First Amendment, the reckless disregard standard seeks to prevent government officials, as well as those who wield great power and influence, from enlisting the coercive power of the government to silence their critics except in extraordinary cases. 155 The Fourth Amendment is also intended to protect the people from the tyranny of the government. Here, however, the warrant clause guarantees individual freedom and security by prohibiting government agents from forcibly invading the sanctity of a person's home. Absent both probable cause and a valid warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, based on the demonstration of sufficient specific facts, and sworn to under oath by the law enforcement officer, the government has no right to breach one's individual security. The neutral and detached magistrate must then draw the independent conclusion that the invasion is justified. 156 Under the Fourth Amendment, there exists no countervailing value in exaggerations, distortions, vilifications, mischaracterizations, unsupported conclusory statements, or even reckless falsehoods. These exemplify poor, sloppy police work that threaten the security and liberty of law-abiding citizens and should therefore be minimized as much as possible.
Contrasting standards of proof and appellate review reflect the differing meaning of the term "reckless disregard for the truth" under the First and Fourth Amendments. In First Amendment jurisprudence, a party must prove reckless disregard by clear and convincing evidence. An appellate court then applies de novo review to the trial judge's determination in order to ensure the protection of the private individual from the coercive power of the government. 157 On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment protects individual liberty by treating reckless disregard as a pure question of fact, provable by a preponderance of the evidence, and only subject to appellate review for clear 158 error.
Substantive First Amendment interpretations of the reckless disregard for the truth standard are also directly contrary to established Fourth Amendment doctrine. One important purpose of the reckless disregard standard is to protect the right of private speakers to make broad, conclusory general statements and even adopt "one of a number of possible rational interpretations" of an ambiguous event.' 59 In contrast, bedrock Fourth Amendment doctrine dictates that under the warrant clause, the law enforcement affiant must accurately report the specific facts. Only the neutral and detached magistrate may draw any inferences or conclusions from the facts contained in the warrant affidavit. A warrant based on the mere conclusions or interpretations of the events by the law enforcement officer is clearly invalid. 160 Indeed, a law enforcement officer who conducts a search on the basis of such a warrant cannot even claim the benefit of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.'
61 While under First Amendment principles, the reckless disregard standard seeks to free public debate from the rigid standards of provable truthfulness which govern testimony given in a legal proceeding, a warrant affidavit is a legal document, the truthfulness of which is sworn to under oath by the affiant.'
62 Allowing a Even the Supreme Court has recognized that its First Amendment standard "puts a premium on ignorance. ' 64 Under the First Amendment, a publisher has no duty to investigate before making a defamatory statement about a public official or public figure. 165 Whatever the wisdom of tolerating ignorance in First Amendment jurisprudence, it is certainly terrible public policy to accept statements made in ignorance by trained law enforcement officers. The obligation of a person swearing an oath to tell the truth is entirely different from remarks made in the public discourse.
Most fundamentally, the First Amendment reckless disregard standard directly contradicts both the text and any rational interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the First Amendment, which operates to prohibit certain government actions, the Fourth Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation on the government, including its law enforcement officers, not to invade the security of individuals and their homes absent the demonstrated existence of probable cause. Contrary to First Amendment doctrine, a Fourth Amendment duty to investigate is widely accepted in the case law.' 66 Under the First Amendment a publisher has no duty to ascertain the reliability, veracity, or accuracy of an informant or of the information received. A finding of reckless disregard for the truth requires proof that the publisher had "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." ' 67 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant affidavit to establish facts sufficient to demonstrate the reliability, credibility, and veracity of the informant in the absence of other evidence of probable cause.' The Court in Franks also explained that it based its holding on the "oath or The proper source of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the oath or affirmation provision of the Fourth Amendment is not found in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, one finds its source in the law of perjury. Under the law of perjury, "when one makes an unqualified statement of a fact as true which he does not know to be true,. . . such unqualified statement will itself constitute perjury."' 174 Under the Fourth Amendment, as under the law of perjury, when a law enforcement officer swears an oath, she must know or believe that the contents of the affidavit are actually true, not merely that there is "a possibility that they might be true." ' In Franks, the Supreme Court held that in addition to proving that a warrant affidavit contains one or more intentionally or recklessly false statements, the individual challenging the warrant also must establish that, "with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause" in order to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant. 179 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has explained that neither the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule nor the immunity doctrines, which ordinarily protect law enforcement officers from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are applicable if a warrant affidavit contains perjurious statements.
Thus, the remainder of the affidavit must establish actual, not merely arguable, probable cause. This probable cause determination is an issue of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Unfortunately, the federal courts of appeals have subverted these doctrinal principles. As a practical matter, the "corrected affidavits doctrine" proposes that courts should embark on an unpromising factual quest to determine what information the law enforcement affiant knew or believed to be true at the time they subscribed the warrant affidavit. 84 The doctrine proceeds on the dubious premise that the law enforcement affiant deliberately chose to omit truthful information known at the time and instead inserted intentional or reckless falsehoods into the affidavit.
The more likely scenario is that a law enforcement officer willing to commit perjury in a sworn affidavit will have little reluctance to fabricate these omitted facts when questioned later.' 85 Indeed, the Second Circuit's "corrected affidavits approach" encourages police officers to file intentionally or recklessly false warrant affidavits because they can never end in a worse situation for doing so. Law enforcement affiants' intentional or reckless falsehoods serve only one conceivable purpose: securing the issuance of a warrant, which the magistrate might otherwise have denied. The police officer knows that a defendant might never challenge the affidavit, but if she does, a successful search will place the facts allegedly known earlier in a more favorable light at the subsequent suppression hearing. Thus, the "corrected affidavits approach" "not only. The United States Supreme Court correctly held in Franks that once a warrant affidavit is found to contain intentionally or recklessly false statements of fact, those falsehoods must be redacted. The decision of whether to suppress the evidence found in the resulting search must be based solely on the "remaining content" of the affidavit.
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Judicial consideration of any information not contained in the original affidavit runs contrary to both the requirement of ex ante review by a neutral and detached magistrate as well as the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 191. The probable cause test as set forth in Gates requires that the magistrate base his determination of probable cause on the "totality of circumstances" set forth in the affidavit. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) . Gates presupposes that the underlying affidavit sets forth all the facts comprising the totality of the circumstances then known to the affiant. In contrast, the "corrected affidavits doctrine" affirmatively encourages law enforcement affiants to omit known, relevant information from the affidavit by permitting the later supplementation of the affidavit with after-the-fact testimony. See Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004). Judicial acceptance of a police policy or practice of omitting important, usually exculpatory, information from warrant affidavits institutionalizes the issuance of warrants by magistrates who never know the totality of the circumstances as required by Gates. See 
B. Actual Versus Arguable Probable Cause
The federal courts of appeals have found especially troublesome the question of whether the remainder of the warrant affidavit must establish actual, or merely arguable, probable cause. Some courts have erroneously permitted arguable probable cause to validate a warrant affidavit containing one or more perjurious statements by holding that no Franks violation exists unless a magistrate "could not have found probable cause" on the basis of the truthful remainder of the affidavit. 192 The use of this test for evaluating the truthful remainder of the affidavit has the untoward effect of encouraging police perjury. The judge conducts the later review of the affidavit under a more lenient standard than that applied by the original magistrate who initially determined whether actual probable cause existed in the affidavit.
The proper standard a court should apply, once it has determined that a warrant affidavit contains intentionally or recklessly false statements, is actual probable cause. The fact-finder steps into the role of the original magistrate and simply repeats the probable cause inquiry. The reviewing judge should not give any deference to the magistrate's prior determination for the fundamental reason that the magistrate never reviewed the untainted facts. In other words, the fact-finder "cannot defer to a magistrate's consideration of an application for a search warrant that the magistrate in effect did not review." 194 Any standard less than de novo review is inappropriate because the original magistrate was unaware of the affiant's perjury and therefore could not make an informed determination of the affiant's credibility. 195 Stated another way, the issue is whether "[t]he force of the lies on the mind of the magistrate can be bleached out."
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Much of the confusion surrounding the subsequent determination of whether probable cause exists is due to the failure of courts and commentators to analyze its proper role in constitutional jurisprudence.
The presence of probable cause in the truthful remainder of an affidavit does not negate the fact that perjured affidavits violate the Fourth Amendment. Even when probable cause is present, "[t]he search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." ' 197 When the warrant affidavit contains perjurious statements, one cannot fairly say that the magistrate ever determined ex ante the sufficiency of the remaining content. Rather, the magistrate based her ex ante determination on the totality of the facts and circumstances set forth in the original affidavit, not on the basis of some then-unspecified portion of that affidavit. 198 The Fourth Amendment violation inherent in any warrant based on a perjured affidavit is not a merely technical one because "[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause .... 99 The foregoing paragraphs suggest the correct answer to the question of the proper role of probable cause in the Franks analysis. The probable cause issue in Franks should be framed not as a question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, but whether the law should grant a remedy for such a violation. As the Supreme Court held in Hudson v. Michigan, 20 0 "[wihether the exclusionary remedy is appropriately imposed in a particular case. . . is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct."' 20 1 The
Hudson Court reasoned that the remedy of exclusion is only appropriate when the Fourth Amendment violation has caused constitutionally cognizable 202 harm. Thus, probable cause in this context is a causation issue. Causation's centrality to the exclusionary remedy's existence and scope explains both the Supreme Court's "independent source" doctrine 2 0 3 and its close relative, the "inevitable discovery" rule. 20 4 Both doctrines have their foundation in the causal distinction identified by Justice Holmes as "knowledge ... gained from an independent source," which is not subject to exclusion, and "knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong," which is not admissible in a criminal proceeding. Franks is simply an application of the "independent source" doctrine. In Franks, the truthful content of the original warrant affidavit, which remains after redaction of the intentional or reckless falsehoods, constitutes the asserted "independent source." If the magistrate would have issued the requested warrant solely on the basis of the truthful content of the affidavit, then, under the "independent source" doctrine, no causal connection exists between the intentional or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit and the issuance of the warrant by the magistrate.
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Similarly, causation is an essential element of any civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation. 20 7 In order to establish liability, the civil plaintiff must prove that the presence of the intentional or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" in the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.
2 1 Courts also routinely use this standard of causation in analogous areas of the law. For example, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 2 0 9 the Supreme Court stated the test of materiality for actionable omissions from proxy statements as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.... It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. 210 This causation standard is also analogous to the materiality test used to determine criminal liability for perjury. A person commits perjury if she makes an intentionally or recklessly false statement under oath that has "a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which it was addressed., 2 11 In order to sustain a conviction for perjury, the prosecution need not prove "that the perjured testimony actually influenced the relevant decision-making body." 212 Today, Fourth Amendment issues are ordinarily subordinated to concerns about the proper scope of the exclusionary rule as well as the role of qualified immunity in constitutional adjudication. These mediating doctrines protect dutiful and honest law enforcement officials who act in good faith and with objective reasonableness. Neither doctrine was designed to protect dishonest police officers who file perjurious warrant affidavits. Unfortunately, in the absence of clear guidance from either the United States Supreme Court or legal scholars, lower courts have erected inappropriate legal barriers to the eradication of perjurious warrant affidavits.
Properly interpreted, Franks v. Delaware and other Supreme Court precedent hold that a law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment when the trier of fact finds that the officer made intentionally or recklessly false statements in a warrant affidavit. In such cases, the officer is not entitled to benefit from the good faith doctrine or qualified immunity. The trier of fact exclusively determines whether the truthful remainder of the affidavit sufficiently establishes actual, not merely arguable, probable cause.
Unlike much of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this interpretation approximates the Founding Father's original vision. 244 It offers realistic protection from unjustified police intrusions into the home. It also recognizes that intentionally or recklessly false statements in warrant affidavits serve no legitimate law enforcement purpose. Rather, they are destructive of [Vol. XLI:445
